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The Limits of Market Efﬁciency
Abstract:
The framework rules within which either market or political activity takes place must
be classiﬁed in the non-partitionability set under the Samuelson taxonomy. Therefore
there is nothing comparable to the proﬁt-loss dynamic of the market that will insure any
continuing thrust toward more desirable rules. ‘Public choice’ has at least partially suc-
ceeded in getting economists to remove the romantic blinders toward politics and politi-
cians as providers of non-partitionable goods. It is equally necessary to be hard-nosed in
evaluating markets as providers of non-partitionable rules.
1. Introduction
Economists, along with other observers, were too complaisant during the devel-
opment and utilization of innovative ﬁnancial instruments prior to the crises
of 2007–9. Although seldom explicitly stated, the ‘markets work’ attitude was
descriptive of a widely shared behavioral stance. This paper explains some of
the sources of this attitude. The aim is to identify misconceptions and misun-
derstandings that allowed economists to neglect elementary presuppositions. In
summary, the argument is that ‘markets work, but only within limits’. First, it
is useful to describe (section 2) the stylized setting in which market organization
generates results that are generally evaluated to be positive in an ultimate nor-
mative judgment. The means through which markets insure these results war-
rant attention. Section 3 exposes the limitations of the stylized model, and par-
ticularly emphasizes the necessary presupposition that all valued goods are par-
titionable. Section 4 speciﬁcally examines the ‘publicness’ or non-partitionability
of the framework rules within which market exchanges take place. Section 5
challenges the implicit presupposition that the emergence and survival of rules
become, in themselves, a justiﬁcatory basis for an assessment of ‘efﬁciency’. Fi-
nally, Section 6 calls for a fresh start based on a realistic understanding of the
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2. The Parameters of Market Success
The usage of the terms ‘market success’ and ‘market failure’ implies the ex-
istence of some scalar for measurement. What does it mean to say that ‘the
market’ succeeds or fails? ‘The market’, of course, does nothing; reference is to
the structural framework within which economic interaction takes place. To say
that ‘the market works’ or ‘the market fails’ draws attention to the institutions
that allow results to be generated that are assessed positively or negatively. To
shift to more analytically useful terminology, we say that market success is in-
terpreted as the attainment of efﬁciency in the allocation of valued resources.
Obversely, market failure imputes inefﬁciency to allocations.
Questions of deﬁnitions remain. What does ‘efﬁciency’ mean? Unless nor-
mative criteria are drawn from sources beyond the evaluation of participants
in the economy, the only meaningful objective becomes the satisfaction of the
preferences of those participants, whatever this might be, with no preferences
privileged over others. Whether or not preferences exist, or can be postulated
to exist, independent of and prior to the exchange process itself, need not be of
concern here. Basic epistemological issues emerge only when analysis moves
beyond identiﬁcation.
The whole exercise becomes meaningful, however, only on the presupposition
that pre-exchange endowments and capacities to create value are well deﬁned
and that separate rights to these endowments-capacities are enforced, along
with contracts in exchanges.
Particular attention must be drawn to the seldom recognized requirement
that rights to endowments-capacities and to ﬁnal products must be separable, or
partitionable, as among different persons and organizations. Paul Samuelson’s
1954 taxonomy becomes applicable. For the market to generate fully efﬁcient
results, all valued goods must be ‘private’, that is, both excludable and rivalrous,
in the familiar post-Samuelson categorization.
A critical presupposition for the ultimate question of institutional-organiza-
tional comparison is the presumed competence of persons to make their own
choices and to do so in systematically meaningful patterns of behavior. In this
sense, the whole exercise embodies the imputation of the capacity for rational
choice to all participants.
In the setting so described, why do markets generate ‘efﬁcient’ results? They
do so because of the additional presumption that the existence of any oppor-
tunity for rents over and beyond ‘natural’ levels will attract the attention of
potential arbitrageurs who will act so as to insure dissipation of the differential
opportunity. The market setting facilitates this dissipation of predicted rents
because of the multiplier elements in the adjustment process. The prospective
arbitrageur who recognizes unexploited rent potential can invest whatever is
deemed to be differentially proﬁtable. Adjustments are not limited to prior ex-
change levels. The classic Chicago-Winnipeg wheat market illustrates. A sin-
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transport cost and a price difference. Further, other traders in the market need
not have the information that motivates the initiating arbitrageur.
Within the parameters sketched out previously, separate markets for valued
inputs and outputs will generate results that meet Pareto-efﬁciency criteria.
Acceptance of this conclusion does not imply that all goods that meet the condi-
tions required are necessarily assigned to the disposition of markets. Collective-
political-legal constraints, whether these be deliberately chosen or generated in
some evolutionary process, may prevent voluntary exchanges in some inputs
and outputs that are positively valued. For such goods whether or not markets
would operate to generate efﬁcient results becomes irrelevant. The presupposi-
tions outlined in this section apply only to goods that are produced, traded, and
consumed in the ‘private’ sector.
3. Limitations of Stylized Models
By placing the inclusive set of all valued goods into two subsets, Samuelson
allows the apparent applicability of the ‘market works’ judgment to be dramat-
ically restricted to goods that fully meet the partitionability criterion. Unfortu-
nately, Samuelson, along with those with whom he normatively differs, jumps
too quickly from the stylized nonpartitionability classiﬁcation to the inference
that collective-political correction is in order. As early as 1962, I demonstrated
that nonpartitionability is a necessary feature of politically orchestrated correc-
tion, an insight that was developed more completely in the public choice research
program (Buchanan 1962).
The Samuelson taxonomy, along with the accompanying analysis, nonethe-
less remains useful to the extent that traded goods, as observed, may be assigned
locations along some provisionally imagined spectrum. Empirically, of course,
few goods exhibit full partitionability as they enter markets. In the absence
of speciﬁc collective action, if the necessary conditions are met, markets will
emerge for all valued goods as entrepreneurs are attracted by promised rents.
Production and exchange will be more readily organized for goods that more
closely resemble the partitionablity limit. But entrepreneurial effort will also
emerge for other goods, efforts that will be aimed to make some partitionability,
and hence exchange, possible.
The default position that would occur in the absence of explicit collective
action toward correction for market failure in those goods that are nonparti-
tionable is not best described by the total absence of production and exchange.
Instead, production and exchange will occur that allow some rents to be gained
by prospective entrepreneurs. This set of goods exchanged, as observed, may
be physically different from any nonpartitionable idealization, but the market
order may or may not provide some net value.
Coase’s critique of Samuelson’s lighthouse illustration is relevant (Coase
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provided by market activity to undermine the Samuelson organizational in-
ference. He failed to appreciate, however, that the lighthouses that were ob-
served under privately marketed conditions may have been different in kind
from those identiﬁed to be inefﬁcient in the Samuelson logic. Re-establishment
of the Samuelson understanding does not, of course, imply that the Coasian
market order for lighthouses is likely to be less or more efﬁcient than any po-
litical correction, with its necessary incentive incompabilities. Both Coase and
Samuelson, as representatives of conﬂicting normative stances, were overly anx-
ious to draw organizational conclusions from stylized models.
4. Rules as Nonpartitionable Goods
Most of the discussion of market failure and market success has been carried
on, often implicitly, within the institutional parameters that include the assign-
ment and enforcement of rights and contracts, along with monetary predictabil-
ity. Discussion in preceding sections of this paper does not extend beyond these
familiar limits. This stance cannot, however, be sustained beyond analytical
models. Comparative evaluation of market institutions, on the one hand, and
those of political corrective activity, on the other, must attend to the framework
itself.
Speciﬁcally, the question becomes: Under what conditions do the rules (in-
stitutions), either as they are observed to exist or as alternatives that might be
imagined, embody attributes that are analogous to the efﬁciency norms that are
applied to the within-rules allocative processes? The central point that must be
recognized is that the framework rules within which either market or political
activity takes place must be classiﬁed in the nonpartitionability set under the
Samuelson taxonomy, along with the consequent implications.
This initial step in any analysis is obvious in any society that is described by
widespread adherence of the rule of law. The law, as such, is generalizable as it
applies for all members of the body politic. The law is both nonexcludable and
nonrival. Even if departures from the generality of the rule of law allow differ-
ent treatment of designated persons or groups, the inclusive structure remains
nonpartitionable in the sense that particularized access cannot be ‘traded’ be-
tween members of privileged or nonprivileged groups and others outside deﬁned
limits.
Several early contributors, myself included, recognized explicitly that law, or
the legal-political framework generally, could be classiﬁed as a nonpartitionable
‘good’ in the Samuelson taxonomy (Buchanan 1975). But we have been remiss
in our failure to examine the consequences of this recognition. We did not ask:
What does ‘law’, deﬁned inclusively, embody in the absence of some idealized
constitutional contract?
As noted, the potential gains (rents) promised by an implementation of effec-
tive order must attract the attention of prospective entrepreneurs. And, as theThe Limits of Market Efﬁciency 5
lighthouse model illustrates, efforts may be directed toward locating substitutes
for the ‘good’, as ideally stylized. Analogously, the motivation for the market-
like provision of services that are yielded by workable constraints imposed on
ordinary market dealings is the potential suppliers’ rent rather than attention
to the general interest.
The interesting but romanticized constitutional convention open to all per-
sons and groups in the putative body politic does not often meet historical stan-
dards for accuracy. But, failing some such device, how can discussion and anal-
ysis proceed?
By analogous extension, we may again refer to the lighthouse example. In
the stylized nonpartitionable setting, as Samuelson postulated it, Coasian en-
trepreneurs emerged. Lighthouse services were supplied, but these were physi-
cally and locationally deﬁned by some prospects of converting nonpartitionable
into partitionable value. Mancur Olson (1965) and Dwight Lee (1999), among
others, have noted that marketable by-products of nonpartitionable goods may
offer one means through which markets may generate value, possibly moving
toward the efﬁciency frontier.
Inattention to the framework rules while concentrating analyses on within-
rules allocative processes becomes equivalent to an implicit presumption that
all goods and services that are valued are partitionable, and hence amenable
to market exchange among separated end users. The Samuelson exercise of
classiﬁcation aimed at assistance in some ultimate organizational assessment
remains empty. In this vision, there is no interdependence that both requires
and allows for collective action. Unconscious adherence to such a methodological
stance does, indeed, prompt acceptance of a generalized ‘markets work’ attitude.
5. Rules as Spontaneously Emergent
What is the effect here when we recognize that elements of law are not chosen, as
such, in a legislative or even a constitutional process, but are, instead, generated
through some institutional evolution by way of case-by-case adjudication. Does
this emergent property of ‘the law’, at least in part, promote results that are in
some sense analogous to those forthcoming from within-rules market exchanges
in goods and services?
The ‘public’, or beyond-exchange interdependence, may be acknowledged in
application to ‘legislation’, in Hayekian terminology, that is to collective-political
action aimed explicitly at market failure correction. But the relevance of this
within-politics difﬁculty may seem to be minimized to the extent that the frame-
work rules are not explicitly chosen, as such. This set of rules, this ‘law’, it can be
argued, may be generated through decentralized adjustments made for separate
conﬂicts.
The analogy between the spontaneous emergence of law through case-by-
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markets is misleading, however, and its implicit acceptance has surely inﬂu-
enced the thinking of economists, and perhaps especially those who have con-
tributed to the research program in law and economics. Bruno Leoni (1961) and
F. A. Hayek (1979), who are the seminal contributors here, are sources of pos-
sible confusion, and especially as they extend analysis in support of normative
organizational implications. Empirically, of course, many elements of existing
law, and notably in societies dominated by common law institutions, are not,
and have never been, chosen in some constitutional-legislative process. Such el-
ements have indeed evolved in case-by-case settlement of adversary claims. And
the Leoni-Hayek insight that this process is in many respects analogous to the
working of the market is indeed useful.
The evolution of law, however, cannot be assessed against a scalar akin to
that which informs observation and understanding of market order. At least in
the stylized models, the market ‘works’ to move to move allocation toward the
Pareto frontier, which is a meaningful conception. The market does so because
participants are presumed to be motivated by their own interests, as Adam
Smith recognized. There is no comparable scalar for the judge who must choose
among conﬂicting claims but who has no independently determined criterion
that may be invoked.
Consider, somewhat further, the differences between the spontaneous emer-
gence of a body of law, a set of rules, and the allocation of valued resources in the
market process. In the latter, because of the presumed partitionability of goods
and services that are exchanged, opportunities for securing differential private
rents and avoiding differential negative rents are open and available to prospec-
tive entrepreneurs-arbitrageurs, whose behavior, in itself, becomes part of the
correction that efﬁciency conditions require. Contrast this process with applica-
tion to law. Suppose that a law, rule, or convention emerges and exists, one that
is recognized, even if by all participants, to be less enhancing to their well-being
than a readily imagined alternative. The opportunity cannot, however, be ex-
ploited by single entrepreneurs-artibrageurs because of the nonpartitionability
of law, as such. There is nothing comparable to the proﬁt-loss dynamic of the
market that will insure any continuing thrust toward more desirable outcomes.
The rule in question may survive while remaining destructive of potential value,
at least in an opportunity cost sense.
6. Clearing the Decks
Two separate but related misconceptions have been identiﬁed that have surely
inﬂuenced widespread acceptance of the ‘market works’ set of attitudes in pub-
lic, policy, and academic discussion. First, the nonpartitionability of law, or of
framework rules more generally, was not recognized, along with consequent im-
plications. Second, the differences between the evolutionary development of law
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Where, then, does the discussion here leave the confrontation before the basic
organizational question: Under what conditions will markets work? And when
will markets fail? We are brought back to what I have elsewhere referred to
as ‘old Chicago school thinking’, the stance that accepts that markets work, but
only within properly deﬁned constraints, but would never claim that markets
can effectively generate their own constraints or rules (Buchanan 2010).
Clearly the rules, or the absence thereof, did not work in the crises of 2007–9.
Political economists failed in their continuing neglect of the examination of insti-
tutional structures. They failed to apply critical insights to the innovations that
the revolution in information technology made possible. They simply acquiesced
in the implied laissez faire allowed for developments in the ﬁnancial sector.
What is needed here is extended examination and inquiry into the emergence
of both historically observed and imagined rules that are generated from the
propelling motivation of separable rents, but rules that necessarily impact on
all members of the body politic. What does institutional (constitutional) laissez
faire produce?
As a research program, public choice has at least partially succeeded in get-
ting economists to remove the romantic blinders toward politics and politicians.
It is equally necessary to be hard-nosed in evaluating markets, and especially
when voluntary contracts are made among those who are only subsets of the
inclusive set of affected parties.
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